Wednesday, 7 October 2015

Look back on Indo-Pak War 1965 (1 of 2)


Indo-Pakistani War of 1965

Indo-Pakistani War of 1965
Part of the Indo-Pakistani Wars
DateAugust – 23 September 1965
LocationSouth Asia
Result
Belligerents
 India Pakistan
Commanders and leaders
India Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan
(President of India)
India Lal Bahadur Shastri
(Prime Minister of India)
 J.N Chaudhuri
(Chief of the Army Staff)
 Lt.Gen. Harbaksh Singh
(Western Army Command)
 ACM Arjan Singh
(Chief of the Air Staff)
 Maj.Gen. Gurbaksh Singh
(GOC, 15th Infantry Division)
Flag of Indian Army.svg Brig. Z.C.Bakhshi
 Ayub Khan
(President of Pakistan)
 Gen Muhammad Musa
(Chief of Army Staff)
 AM Malik Nur Khan
(Chief of Air Staff)
 Adm S.M. Ahsan
(Chief of Naval Staff)
 LGen Bakhtiar Rana
(Commander, I Corps)
 MGen Tikka Khan
(GOC12th Regiment Artillery)
 MGen A.H. Malik
(GOC12th Army Infantry)
 MGen Iftikhar Janjua
 BGen A.A. Malik
(24th Army Infantry)
 Cdre S.M. Anwar
(Commander, 25th Navy Group)
Strength
700,000 Infantry[2]
720 Tanks[2]
628 Artillery[3]
260,000 Infantry[2]
756 Tanks[3]
552 Artillery[3]
  • 72x105mm How[3]
  • 234X25pdr[3]
  • 126x155mm How[3]
  • 48x8" How[3]
  • 72x3.7" How[3]
  • POK Lt Btys[3]
Casualties and losses
Neutral claims[4][5]
Indian claims
  • 35[9]-59 aircraft lost[10]In addition, Indian sources claim that there were 13 IAF aircraft lost in accidents, and 3 Indian civilian aircraft shot down.[11]
  • 322 km2 territory lost[12]
Pakistani claims
  • 8,200 men killed or captured[12]
  • 110[13]-113[12] aircraft destroyed
  • 500 tanks captured or destroyed [12]
  • 2602,[14] 2575 km2[12]territory gained
Neutral claims[4]
Pakistani claims
  • 19 aircraft lost[13]
Indian claims
  • 5259 men killed or captured [12]
  • 43[16] -73 aircraft destroyed [12]
  • 471 tanks destroyed[12]
  • 3,900 km2[17] territory gained
The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 was a culmination of skirmishes that took place between April 1965 and September 1965 between Pakistan and India.
This war started following Pakistan'sOperation Gibraltar, which was designed to infiltrate forces into Jammu and Kashmir to precipitate an insurgency against rule by India. India retaliated by launching a full-scale military attack on West Pakistan. The seventeen-day war caused thousands of casualties on both sides and also witnessed the largest tank battle since World War II. The hostilities between the two countries ended after a ceasefire was declared following diplomatic intervention by the Soviet Union and the United States, and the subsequent issuance of the Tashkent Declaration.[18] Both India and Pakistan claimed victory. However, most neutral assessments agree that India had the upper hand over Pakistan when ceasefire was declared.[19][20][21][22][23] Shah Alam states that the 1965 war exposed Pakistan's inadequate training at all levels, misguided selection of officers, poor command and control arrangements, poor intelligence gathering and bad intelligence procedures. In spite of these shortcomings, Pakistan Army had managed to fight the large Indian Army.[24]
Much of the war was fought by the countries' land forces in Kashmir and along the borderbetween India and Pakistan. This war saw the largest amassing of troops in Kashmir since the Partition of British India in 1947, a number that was overshadowed only during the2001–2002 military standoff between India and Pakistan. Most of the battles were fought by opposing infantry and armoured units, with substantial backing from air forces, and naval operations. Many details of this war, like those of other Indo-Pakistani Wars, remain unclear.[1] Following the incident, Defence Day is celebrated annually in Pakistan on 6 September.[25]

Pre-war escalation


A declassified US State Department letter that confirms the existence of hundreds of "infiltrators" in the Indian-administered part of the disputed Kashmir region. Dated during the events running up to the 1965 war.
Since Partition of British India in 1947, Pakistan and India remained in contention over several issues. Although the Kashmir conflict was the predominant issue dividing the nations, other border disputes existed, most notably over the Rann of Kutch, a barren region in the Indian state of Gujarat. The issue first arose in 1956 which ended with India regaining control over the disputed area.[26] Pakistani patrols began patrolling in territory controlled by India in January 1965, which was followed by attacks by both countries on each other's posts on 8 April 1965.[26][27] Initially involving border police from both nations, the disputed area soon witnessed intermittent skirmishes between the countries' armed forces. In June 1965,British Prime Minister Harold Wilsonsuccessfully persuaded both countries to end hostilities and set up a tribunal to resolve the dispute. The verdict, which came later in 1968, saw Pakistan awarded 350 square miles (910 km2) of the Rann of Kutch, as against its original claim of 3,500 square miles (9,100 km2).[28]
After its success in the Rann of Kutch, Pakistan, under the leadership of GeneralAyub Khan, believed the Indian Army would be unable to defend itself against a quick military campaign in the disputed territory ofKashmir as the Indian military had suffered a loss to China in 1962.[1] Pakistan believed that the population of Kashmir was generally discontented with Indian rule and that a resistance movement could be ignited by a few infiltrating saboteurs. Pakistan attempted to ignite the resistance movement by means of a covert infiltration, codenamed Operation Gibraltar.[29] The Pakistani infiltrators were soon discovered, however, their presence reported by local Kashmiris,[30] and the operation ended unsuccessfully.

The war

On 5 August 1965 between 26,000 and 33,000 Pakistani soldiers crossed the Line of Controldressed as Kashmiri locals headed for various areas within Kashmir. Indian forces, tipped off by the local populace, crossed the cease fire line on 15 August.[1]

Commander-in-Chief Pakistan Army, General Muhammad Musa visiting the captured Khemkaran Railway Station,India
Initially, the Indian Army met with considerable success, capturing three important mountain positions after a prolonged artillery barrage. By the end of August, however, both sides had relative progress; Pakistan had made progress in areas such as TithwalUri and Poonch and India had captured the Haji Pir pass, 8 km into Pakistan-Administered Kashmir.[31]
On 1 September 1965, Pakistan launched a counterattack, called Operation Grand Slam, with the objective to capture the vital town ofAkhnoor in Jammu, which would sever communications and cut off supply routes to Indian troops. Ayub Khan calculated that "Hindu morale would not stand more than a couple of hard blows at the right time and place"[32][33][34] although by this time Operation Gibraltar had failed and India had captured the Haji Pir Pass.[32][35] At 3:30 hours, on 1 September 1965, the entire Chhamb area came under massive artillary bombardment. Pakistan had launched operation Grand Slam and India's Army Headquarter was taken by Surprise.[36]Attacking with an overwhelming ratio of troops and technically superior tanks, Pakistan made gains against Indian forces, who were caught unprepared and suffered heavy losses. India responded by calling in itsair force to blunt the Pakistani attack. The next day, Pakistan retaliated, its air forceattacked Indian forces and air bases in bothKashmir and Punjab. India's decision to open up the theater of attack into Pakistani Punjab forced the Pakistani army to relocate troops engaged in the operation to defend Punjab. Operation Grand Slam therefore failed, as the Pakistan Army was unable to capture Akhnoor; it became one of the turning points in the war when India decided to relieve pressure on its troops in Kashmir by attacking Pakistan further south. In the valley, another area of strategic importance was Kargil. Kargil town was in Indian hands but the Pakistan occupied high ground overlooking Kargil and Srinagar-Leh road. However, after the launch of a massive anti-infiltration operation by the Indian army, the Pakistani infiltrators were forced out of that area in the month of August.[37]

Lt. Col. Hari Singh of the India's 18th Cavalry posing outside a captured Pakistani police station (Barkee) in Lahore District.
India crossed the International Border on the Western front on 6 September, marking an official beginning of the war.[38] On 6 September, the 15th Infantry Division of the Indian Army, under World War II veteran Major General Prasad, battled a massive counterattack by Pakistan near the west bank of the Ichogil Canal (BRB Canal), which was ade facto border of India and Pakistan. The General's entourage itself was ambushed and he was forced to flee his vehicle. A second, this time successful, attempt to cross the Ichhogil Canal was made over the bridge in the village of Barki, just east of Lahore. These developments brought the Indian Army within the range of Lahore International Airport. As a result, the United States requested a temporary ceasefire to allow it to evacuate its citizens in Lahore. However, the Pakistani counterattack took Khem Karan from Indian forces which tried to divert the attention of Pakistanis from Khem Karan by an attack on Bedian and the adjacent villages.
The thrust against Lahore consisted of the 1st Infantry Division supported by the three tank regiments of the 2nd Independent Armoured Brigade; they quickly advanced across the border, reaching the Ichhogil (BRB) Canal by 6 September. The Pakistani Army held the bridges over the canal or blew up those it could not hold, effectively stalling any further advance by the Indians on Lahore.One unit of the Indian Jat Regiment, 3 Jat, had also crossed the Ichogil canal and captured[39] the town of Batapore (Jallo Mur to Pakistan) on the west side of the canal. The same day, a counter offensive consisting of an armoured division and infantry division supported by Pakistan Air Force Sabresforced the Indian 15th Division to withdraw to its starting point. Although 3 Jat suffered minimal casualties, the bulk of the damage being taken by ammunition and stores vehicles, the higher commanders had no information of 3 Jat's capture of Batapore and misleading information led to the command to withdraw from Batapore and Dograi to Ghosal-Dial. This move brought extreme disappointment[40] to Lt-Col Desmond Hayde, CO of 3 Jat. Dograi was eventually recaptured by 3 Jat on 21 September, for the second time but after a much harder battle due to Pakistani reinforcements.

Destroyed or abandoned Pakistani Patton and Sherman tanks on display near Khem Karan. About 97 Pakistani tanks were either destroyed or captured by India during the Battle of Asal Uttar.[41][42]
On 8 September 1965, a company of 5 Maratha Light Infantry was sent to reinforce a Rajasthan Armed Constabulary (RAC) post at Munabao – a strategic hamlet about 250 kilometres from Jodhpur. Their brief was simple. To hold the post and to keep Pakistan's infantry battalions from overrunning the post at bay. But at Maratha Hill (in Munabao) – as the post has now been christened – the Indian company could barely manage to thwart the intense attack for 24 hours. A company of 3 Guards with 954 heavy mortar battery ordered to reinforce the RAC post at Munabao could never reach. The Pakistani Air Force had strafed the entire area, and also hit a railway train coming from Barmer with reinforcements near Gadra road railway station. On 10 September, Munabao fell into Pakistani hands, and efforts to capture the strategic point did not succeed.[43]
On the days following 9 September, both nations' premiere formations were routed in unequal battles. India's 1st Armoured Division, labeled the "pride of the Indian Army", launched an offensive towards Sialkot. The Division divided itself into two prongs, was forced back by the Pakistani 6th Armoured Division at Chawinda and was forced to withdraw after suffering heavy losses of nearly 100 tanks. The Pakistanis followed up their success by launchingOperation Windup, which forced the Indians back farther. Similarly, Pakistan's pride, the 1st Armoured Division, pushed an offensive towards Khem Karan, with the intent to capture Amritsar (a major city in Punjab, India) and the bridge on River Beas toJalandhar.
The Pakistani 1st Armoured Division never made it past Khem Karan, however, and by the end of 10 September lay disintegrated by the defences of the Indian 4th Mountain Division at what is now known as the Battle ofAsal Uttar (lit. meaning – "Real Answer", or more appropriate English equivalent – "Fitting Response"). The area became known as 'Patton Nagar' (Patton Town), because of the large number of US-made Pakistani Patton tanks. Approximately 97 Pakistani tanks were destroyed or abandoned, with only 32 Indian tanks destroyed or damaged. The Pakistani 1st Armoured Division less 5th Armoured Brigade was next sent to Sialkot sector behind Pakistani 6th Armoured Division where it didn't see action as 6th Armoured Division was already in process of routing Indian 1st Armoured Division which was superior to it in strength.
The war was heading for a stalemate, with both nations holding territory of the other. The Indian army suffered 3,000 battlefield deaths, while Pakistan suffered 3,800. The Indian army was in possession of 758.9 miles² (1,920 km²) of Pakistani territory and the Pakistan army held 210 mile² (550 km²) of Indian territory.[44] The territory occupied by India was mainly in the fertile Sialkot, Lahore and Kashmir sectors,[45][46] while Pakistani land gains were primarily south indeserts opposite to Sindh and in Chumbsector near Kashmir in north.[47]

Aerial warfare

The war saw aircraft of the Indian Air Force (IAF) and the Pakistan Air Force (PAF)engaging in combat for the first time since independence. Though the two forces had previously faced off in the First Kashmir Warduring the late 1940s, that engagement was very limited in scale compared to the 1965 conflict.
The IAF was flying large numbers of Hawker Hunter, Indian-manufactured Folland Gnats,de Havilland VampiresEE Canberra bombers and a squadron of MiG-21s. The PAF's fighterforce comprised 102 F-86F Sabres and 12 F-104 Starfighters, along with 24 B-57 Canberrabombers. During the conflict, the PAF claimed it was out-numbered by around 5:1.[48]
The PAF's aircraft were largely of American origin, whereas the IAF flew an assortment of British and Soviet aeroplanes. It has been widely reported that the PAF's American aircraft were superior to those of the IAF.
The F-86 was vulnerable to the diminutiveFolland Gnat, nicknamed "Sabre Slayer."[49]The Gnat is credited by many independent and Indian sources as having shot down seven Pakistani Canadair Sabres[a] in the 1965 war.[50][51] while two Gnats were downed by PAF fighters. The PAF's F-104 Starfighterof the PAF was the fastest fighter operating in the subcontinent at that time and was often referred to as "the pride of the PAF". However, according to Sajjad Haider, the F-104 did not deserve this reputation. Being "a high level interceptor designed to neutralise Soviet strategic bombers in altitudes above 40,000 feet," rather than engage in dogfights with agile fighters at low altitudes, it was "unsuited to the tactical environment of the region."[52]In combat the Starfighter was not as effective as the IAF's far more agile, albeit much slower, Folland Gnat fighter.[53][54] Yet it zoomed into an ongoing dogfight between Sabres and Gnats, at supersonic speed, successfully broke off the fight and caused the Gnats to egress. An IAF Gnat, piloted bySquadron Leader Brij Pal Singh Sikand, landed at an abandoned Pakistani airstrip atPasrur and was captured by the Pakistan Army. The pilot claimed that most of his equipment failed and even if he could get some chance on that, the Starfighters snuffed it.[55][56] This Gnat is displayed as a war trophy in the Pakistan Air Force Museum, KarachiSqn Ldr Saad Hatmi who flew the captured aircraft to Sargodha, and later tested and evaluated its flight performance, was of view that Gnat was no "Sabre Slayer" when it came to dog fighting.[56] The Pakistan Air Force had fought well in countering the much large Indian Air Force and supported the ground forces.[24]

Indian Folland Gnat on display at the PAF Museum Gallery.
The two countries have made contradictory claims of combat losses during the war and few neutral sources have verified the claims of either country. The PAF claimed it shot down 104 IAF planes and lost 19 of its own, while the IAF claimed it shot down 73 PAF planes and lost 59.[57] According to PAF, It flew 86 F-86 Sabres, 10 F-104 Starfighters and 20 B-57 Canberras in a parade soon after the war was over. Thus disproving the IAF's claim of downing 73 PAF fighters, which at the time constituted nearly the entire Pakistani front-line fighter force.[58]
Indian sources have pointed out that, despite PAF claims of losing only a squadron of combat craft, Pakistan sought to acquire additional aircraft from IndonesiaIraqIran,Turkey and China within 10 days of the beginning war.[citation needed]
The two air forces were rather equal in the conflict, because much of the Indian air force remained farther east to guard against the possibility of China entering the war.[59]According to the independent sources, the PAF lost some 20 aircraft while the Indians lost 60–75.[4][5] Pakistan ended the war having depleted 17 percent of its front line strength, while India's losses amounted to less than 10 percent.[citation needed] Moreover, the loss rate had begun to even out, and it has been estimated that another three week's fighting would have seen the Pakistani losses rising to 33 percent and India's losses totalling 15 percent. Air superiority was not achieved, and were unable to prevent IAF fighter bombers and reconnaissance Canberras from flying daylight missions over Pakistan. Thus 1965 was a stalemate in terms of the air war with neither side able to achieve complete air superiority.[59] However, according to Kenneth Werrell, the Pakistan Air Force "did well in the conflict and probably had the edge".[60] When hostilities broke out, the Pakistan Air Force with around 100 F-86s faced an enemy with five times as many combat aircraft; the Indians were also equipped with comparatively modern aircraft inventory. Despite this, Werrell credits the PAF as having the advantage of a "decade's experience with the Sabre" and pilots with long flight hours experience. One Pakistani fighter pilot, MM Alam, was credited with the record of downing five Indian aircraft in less than a minute, becoming the first knownflying ace since the Korean War.[60]

Tank battles


Tanks of 18th Cavalry (Indian Army) on the move during the 1965 Indo-Pak War.
The 1965 war witnessed some of the largest tank battles since World War II. At the beginning of the war, the Pakistani Army had both a numerical advantage in tanks, as well as better equipment overall.[61] Pakistani armour was largely American-made; it consisted mainly of Patton M-47 and M-48tanks, but also included many M4 Shermantanks, some M24 Chaffee light tanks and M36 Jackson tank destroyers, equipped with 90 mm guns.[62] The bulk of India's tank fleet were older M4 Sherman tanks; some were up-gunned with the French high velocity CN 75 50 guns and could hold their own, whilst some older models were still equipped with the inferior 75 mm M3 L/40 gun. Besides the M4 tanks, India fielded the British-madeCenturion Tank Mk 7, with the 105 mm Royal Ordnance L7 gun, and the AMX-13PT-76, andM3 Stuart light tanks. Pakistan fielded a greater number and more modern artillery; its guns out-ranged those of the Indian artillery, according to Pakistan's Major General T.H. Malik.[63]
At the outbreak of war in 1965, Pakistan had about 15 armoured cavalry regiments, each with about 45 tanks in three squadrons. Besides the Pattons, there were about 200 M4 Shermans re-armed with 76 mm guns, 150 M24 Chaffee light tank and a few independent squadrons of M36B1 tank destroyers. Most of these regiments served in Pakistan's two armoured divisions, the 1st and 6th Armoured divisions – the latter being in the process of formation.
The Indian Army of the time possessed 17 cavalry regiments, and in the 1950s had begun modernizing them by the acquisition of 164 AMX-13 light tanks and 188 Centurions. The remainder of the cavalry units were equipped with M4 Shermans and a small number of M3A3 Stuart light tanks. India had only a single armoured division, the 1st 'Black Elephant' Armoured Division, which consisted of the 17th Horse (The Poona Horse), also called 'Fakhr-i-Hind' ('Pride of India'), the 4th Horse (Hodson's Horse), the 16th Cavalry, the7th Light Cavalry, the 2nd Lancers, the 18th Cavalry and the 62nd Cavalry, the two first named being equipped with Centurions. There was also the 2nd Independent Armoured Brigade, one of whose three regiments, the 3rd Cavalry, was also equipped with Centurions.
Despite the qualitative and numerical superiority of Pakistani armour,[64] Pakistan was outfought on the battlefield by India, which made progress into the Lahore-Sialkot sector, whilst halting Pakistan's counteroffensive on Amritsar;[65][66] they were sometimes employed in a faulty manner, such as charging prepared defenses during the defeat of Pakistan's 1st Armoured Division at Asal Uttar.
After India breached the Madhupur canal on 11 September, the Khem Karan counter-offensive was halted, affecting Pakistan's strategy substantially.[32] Although India's tank formations experienced some results, India's attack at the Battle of Chawinda, led by its 1st Armoured Division and supporting units, was brought to halt by the newly raised 6th Armoured Division (ex-100th independent brigade group) in the Chawinda sector. Pakistan claimed that Indians lost 120 tanks at Chawinda.[67] compared to 44 of its own[68]But later, Indian official sources confirmed India lost only 29 tanks at Chawinda.[69][70]Neither the Indian nor Pakistani Army showed any great facility in the use of armoured formations in offensive operations, whether the Pakistani 1st Armoured Division at Asal Uttar or the Indian 1st Armoured Division at Chawinda. In contrast, both proved adept with smaller forces in a defensive role such as India's 2nd Armoured Brigade at Asal Uttar and Pakistan's 25th Cavalry at Chawinda.
The Centurion battle tank, with its 105 mm gun and heavy armour, performed better than the overly complex[need quotation to verify]Pattons.[66]

Naval hostilities

Further information: Operation Dwarka
Naval operations did not play a prominent role in the war of 1965. On 7 September, aflotilla of the Pakistan Navy under the command of Commodore S.M. Anwar, carried out a bombardment of the Indian Navy's radar station coastal down of Dwarka, which was 200 miles (320 km) south of the Pakistani port of Karachi. Operation Dwarka, as it is known, is a significant naval operation of the 1965 war[71][72][73] contested as a nuisance raid by some.[74][75] The attack on Dwarka led to questions being asked in India's parliament[76] and subsequent post-war modernization and expansion of the Indian Navy, with an increase in budget from Rs. 35 crores to Rs. 115 crores.[77]
According to some Pakistani sources, one submarine, PNS Ghazi, kept the Indian Navy's aircraft carrier INS Vikrant besieged inBombay throughout the war. Indian sources claim that it was not their intention to get into a naval conflict with Pakistan, and wished to restrict the war to a land-based conflict.[78]Moreover, they note that the Vikrant was in dry dock in the process of refitting. Some Pakistani defence writers have also discounted claims that the Indian Navy was bottled up in Bombay by a single submarine, instead stating that 75% of the Indian Navy was under maintenance in harbour.[79]

Covert operations

The Pakistan Army launched a number of covert operations to infiltrate and sabotage Indian airbases.[80] On 7 September 1965, theSpecial Services Group (SSG) commandoswere parachuted into enemy territory. According to Chief of Army Staff GeneralMuhammad Musa, about 135 commandos were airdropped at three Indian airfields (HalwaraPathankot and Adampur). The daring attempt proved to be an "unmitigated disaster".[80] Only 22 commandos returned to Pakistan as planned, 93 were taken prisoner (including one of the Commanders of the operations, Major Khalid Butt), and 20 were killed in encounters with the army, police or civilians.[citation needed] The reason for the failure of the commando mission is attributed to the failure to provide maps, proper briefings and adequate planning or preparation.[81]
Despite failing to sabotage the airfields, Pakistan sources claim that the commando mission affected some planned Indian operations. As the Indian 14th Infantry Division was diverted to hunt for paratroopers, the Pakistan Air Force found the road filled with transport, and destroyed many vehicles.[82]
India responded to the covert activity by announcing rewards for captured Pakistanispies or paratroopers.[83] Meanwhile, in Pakistan, rumors spread that India had retaliated with its own covert operations, sending commandos deep into Pakistan territory,[81] but these rumors were later determined to be unfounded.[84]


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